Proceedings of the 54th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences | 2021

Computing and Social Welfare:
Minimizing the Societal Harm From Digital Transformation While Preserving the Benefits of Innovation
Eric K. Clemons
The Wharton School

Ravi Waran
Clearwater Paper Corporation

clemons@upenn.edu

Ravi.Waran@clearwaterpaper.com

Victoria Li
The Wharton School
vli22@sas.upenn.edu

Sebastian Hermes
Technical University of Munich

Maximillian Schreieck
Technical University of Munich

Sebastian.Hermes@in.tum.de

Maximillian.Schreick@in.tum.de

Abstract
Social Welfare Computing is an emerging discipline
that seeks to direct technology to cause minimum social
disruption, and in particular seeks to minimize the harm
caused directly by technology. This is markedly different from the better understood strategic use of technology to create value or to address existing social needs.
Innovative technologies that are widely adopted created
significant value for their users; otherwise they would
not be widely adopted. Often the companies that create
them obtain new sources of wealth and power, which
inevitably lead to new abuses of power and new forms
of societal disruption. Societal disruption in turn requires social adaptation, including new regulations to
influence the behavior of firms and to define and to protect the rights of an individual in the changed society.
Social Welfare Computing seeks to guide social adaptation, combining insights from disciplines as varied as
anthropology, business strategy, economics, strategic
planning, and law.

1. Introduction
We are hearing repeated claims that Big Tech has
gotten too big and too powerful, and that it needs to be
regulated and restrained. We have reviewed several
hundred articles describing these claims in order to formulate a comprehensive list of problem areas. These
claims are most frequently directed against Facebook,
Amazon, Apple, and Google, and the most commonly
proposed regulatory fix is the traditional sanction applied to monopolies, breaking the companies up into
smaller companies that compete with each other. However, many of the problems that have been created by
Big Tech are not caused by the companies’ size or monopoly status, and applying antimonopoly sanctions
may be both unnecessary and ineffective.
The four largest online companies have enormous
power, have transformed traditional consumer services,
and have disrupted society in ways we are just beginning to understand. Although the largest tech companies
receive the most coverage and the harm they can potentially cause receives the most media attention, we will
also address other technology firms, especially in the
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sharing economy, and explore the unanticipated effects
that they have created.
Our research deals with minimizing the harm
caused by technology’s rapid disruption of society,
which is how we have defined Social Welfare Computing [4, 6]. This has received almost no academic study.
Many of our colleagues have studied the benefits and
the value created by large scale technological innovation. Others have studied the use of technology to address existing social problems and to improve education
and social services. But there has been very little study
of the downside of computing, the forms of harm caused
by technological progress, and the reduction or mitigation of those problems

2. Motivation for Our Research Program
and Overview of its Structure
We are conducting a large research program addressing the emerging discipline of social welfare computing [4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 24]. We acknowledge the
extent to which computing both improves aggregate
wealth and aggregate social welfare but feel the need to
explore the burdens it imposes on some segments of society, perhaps unfairly. Big Tech’s power, and the extent of the resulting transformation and disruption, are
only possible because of the widespread adoption of
technology-driven innovation, and this adoption results
from obvious and immediate benefits. Historically, disruption and transformation create losers as well as winners. The speed with which Big Tech firms have
emerged is unprecedented. As a society, how should we
and when should we act to protect those who are harmed,
and who makes the tradeoffs among the value created
and the resulting sources of harm?
We avoid expressing our own opinions whenever
possible and avoid statements like “big data firms monetize personal information by invading privacy, which
is bad.” We focus on specific dichotomies, like “big data
and private information make markets more efficient,
which is good. However, these practices reduce consumer surplus and results in differential pricing, which
may be considered unfair, both of which are seen as bad.”
Wherever possible, we report the opinions of
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affected segments of society, like parents who may be
concerned about privacy and data mining their children’s texts, or how users feel about the possibility that
Facebook may be complicit in fake news campaigns that
seek to manipulate their opinions and may even seek to
manipulate the outcome of elections. The opinions have
been obtained through interviews, focus groups, and
large international surveys.
This is a report on a large ongoing multi-year and
multi-disciplinary international research project. It involves studies conducted in the US, in Japan, Korea, and
China, in Denmark, France, Germany, and the UK, and
in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, and Mexico.
Work was done with faculty colleagues in all of the first
eight countries, involving disciplines like information
technology and computer science, information economics and business strategy, law, and anthropology.
Our ultimate goal is to inform public debate and
policy discussions, and, ultimately to propose regulation
of Big Tech to maximize social welfare, however society and its representatives choose to define social welfare. We are not arguing that Big Tech is good or bad,
or that Big Tech firms are or are not too big, or that they
do or do not enjoy or abuse monopoly power. We are
presenting issues for discussion and moving towards the
creation of policy recommendations. In this paper we
neither propose nor test hypotheses. However, we believe that the rigor of our analyses and the structure of
our research program allows us to avoid proposing a single viewpoint and allows us to guide regulatory policy.
Our research program is a portfolio of interrelated
Projects, in six Phases. See figure 1, below, which explains our research plan. It shows how the Projects fit
into Phases. The first Phase is Motivation and the
Demonstration of the Existence of Problems, which
comprises four Projects. This Phase of research is important because it provides the first motivation for our
work in assessing the costs and benefits of technological
innovation, namely a demonstration that there is a documented history of complaints. The Projects are Recent
History of Privacy Litigation, Recent History of Abuse
of Power from New Business Models, Recent History of
Fake News and Societal Interventions, and Recent History of Complaints about Externalities. The fourth goes
beyond our prior publications and involves complaints
about sharing economy platforms, such as Airbnb’s and
Uber’s impact on communities. We will elaborate on
this in section 6.1 of the paper, where we discuss Phase
4.
The second Phase is Theoretical Background and
Historical Precedent, which comprises three Projects.
This Phase of research is important because it uses evidence from early millennia of human civilization, and
technologies dating back to the agricultural revolution,
to demonstrate that technology always alters the structure of society and that these changes always produce

winners, losers, and new forms of abuse. When these
abuses become sufficiently harmful to social cohesion
they produce changes in the implicit and explicit social
contracts, and changes in the laws regulating commercial behavior. The three Projects are Technology and Social Structure, Technology and Social Contract, and
Technology and the Law. These will not be reviewed in
further detail in this paper.
The third Phase is Recent Historical Precedent and
Lessons from the Industrial Revolution. The industrial
revolution provided the motivation for the first major
period of industrial regulation, and this Phase comprises
three projects. This Phase of research is important because demonstrates the set of tools available to society
and to its regulators for dealing with large technology
firms, and prepares us to explore the limitations of these
tools for mitigating today’s problems in Phase Four.
The Projects are Industrial Revolution and Social Structure, Industrial Revolution and the Social Contract, and
Industrial Revolution and Regulation.
The fourth Phase is Drawing Lessons from Historical Precedent. This Phase represents more recent research, and the work from this Phase is presented in section 3. This Phase of research is important because
demonstrates that the set of available tools is not perfectly designed for mitigating today’s problems, and allows us to explore what additional remedies might be
appropriate. The four Projects are Monopoly Law and
its Limitations, Consumer Safety / Transparency and
Labeling Requirements / and their Limitations, Regulation of Externalities and its Limitations, and Regulation
of New Business Models and Limitations.
The fifth Phase is Assessment of Current Levels of
Support for Regulatory Intervention. This phase comprises four Projects, Interviews with European Executives Exploring American Domination, Consumer Surveys / Trust in Facebook and Google / Trust in Regulators / Willingness to Change, Student and Parental Surveys of Teen Behavior and the Need for Protection, and
Surveys of European Executives Exploring American
Domination and Need for Regulation. This Phase of research is important because is assesses EU executives’
beliefs that they need regulatory protection. It also assesses consumers’ satisfaction with current regulation,
trust in dominant net platform operators, and willingness to accept further regulation. The two most recently
completed projects are summarized in section 7 and represent one of the paper’s major contributions beyond
our previously published research.
The sixth and final Phase is Policy Recommendations, which comprises a single Project, Implications for
Policy and Regulatory Recommendations. This Phase
can’t be completed until we complete all prior Phases.
When completed, this Phase of research will be the most
important contribution of our entire research program.
Preliminary findings are presented in section 8.
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3. Problems Created by the Internet /
Digital Revolution for Which Regulators Have Solutions
3.1.Economies of Scale as a Source of Power
in Online Platforms

congestion by shifting users away from more efficient
mass transit. Airbnb provides users the ability to live in
historical neighborhoods on vacation but this displaces
long-term residents, who have come to despise Airbnb.

Virtually all software exhibits extreme economies
of scale. Development costs are high, as in many forms
of innovation, but with digital downloads the cost of
producing and selling additional copies has dropped to
zero. Virtually all software, like MS Windows and MS
Office, enjoys enormous competitive advantage in part
because its average per-copy cost, as well its marginal
cost, are lower than any smaller competitor could match.
Google Search also enjoys advantage because the larger
its user base the faster its search results adapt to changing conditions in the external world.

A platform is a core system that can readily be extended. Platform envelopment involves the combination
of the following three characteristics: (1) Monopoly
control over the core system, (2) Super-additive value
creation as each additional application added to the core
creates more value for users, including increasing the
value of the core and some or all of the applications already added, and (3) the ability to deliberately reduce
access to the core or to deny access to the core entirely,
to cripple potential competitors [3].
Platform envelopment strategies have existed for
decades. The Radio Commission, the precursor of the
Federal Communications Commission, was created to
address the first occurrence of platform envelopment,
when AT&T leveraged its control over long distance telephony to create a monopoly in radio networks [3].
Platform envelopment has become much more
prevalent with the increased importance of software
platforms [6]. The best known examples involve Microsoft [3, 8] and Google [3, 29].
It is easy to view platform envelopment as an opportunity for all businesses to develop their own platform strategies [21]. This is probably dangerously misguided. Dominant platforms are already well-established. Android is already free both to users and to hardware vendors, and it enjoys enormous network benefits
from millions of apps available.
There are few remedies available. The Essential
Facilities Doctrine would limit the abuse of platforms
like Android. It might be argued that Android is now an
essential facility for app developers who wish to sell to
users of non-Apple devices. Duty to Deal argues that a
firm cannot refuse to work with a competitor it has
worked with previously, solely for commercial reasons
[13]. Neither of these is universally accepted legal doctrine, and the EU is currently treating platform envelopment as a novel abuse of monopoly power.

3.2.Traditional Network Effects
Communications networks, from traditional telephony to social media networks like Facebook and Twitter,
gain their value in large measure from the number of
users they have. The value increases faster than the
number of network users. With limited interconnectivity and dedicated hardware, early networks emerged as
natural monopolies. Today, limited interconnectivity is
often artificially imposed as a means of achieving monopoly power or extending it into new domains [3].

3.3.Economies of Scope and Positive Externalities on the Supply Side
Users gain value from increasing the number of
participants on the other side of the market. When Microsoft’s DOS became the most widely used operating
system other than Apple’s it attracted more software developers, which attracted more users, eventually reaching a tipping point and virtually eliminating its competitors. Numerous other examples have been studied [23].

4. Problems Created by the Internet /
Digital Revolution for Which Regulators Do Not Have Solutions
4.1.The Externality Problems Caused by
Online Platforms
Modern software platforms have impacts beyond
their users, and these are very different from traditional
externalities like congestion or pollution. Negative externalities occur when users of a product or service gain
value themselves, but cause harm to others. Markets
rarely solve problems with externalities because the individuals who cause harm do not suffer harm themselves, and may even be unaware of the harm they cause.
Users love Uber because of its convenience, speed, and
low cost, but may increase urban pollution and traffic

4.2.Platform Envelopment

4.3.Deceptive, Dangerous, and Addictive
Social Media Products
Facebook’s role in the crafting and dissemination
of fake news has been widely reported [30, 20]. Facebook’s role in radicalization and recruiting for extremist
organizations has been widely reported [1]. Facebook
played a role spreading rumors during periods of unrest
and dangerous medical misinformation, as they are doing during the current pandemic.
Search can be dangerously and deliberately inaccurate, as with Google’s support of illegal smuggling of
counterfeit pharmaceuticals through dummy websites
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established to look as if they were Canadian [28].
Users are enticed to use more and more applications
on a single platform, and the more they use, the more
the platform learns about them. The more that platform
learns about them the better the platform’s services become. The dark side of this capture and integration of
information is better manipulation of the users, better
targeted marketing, and better precision pricing. As
firms learn to price products and services to match each
individual’s willingness to pay markets do become
more efficient, but consumer surplus is also reduced;
that is, more and more of the value of technology is appropriated by the provider, not by the user.
The easiest approach to limiting the harm from deceptive, harmful, and addictive products would be labeling, and this would work if users care enough to act differently if they did know. However, there is evidence
that by itself labeling to increase transparency may not
be effective. This has been observed in products as diverse as cigarettes and fake news [25].
Freedom of speech makes it difficult to prohibit all
but the most abusive material. Moreover, Facebook argues that its use of personal information to target fake
news to the most responsive readers is part of its core
strategy of ensuring that users see the content that is
most interesting to them, which is protected even within
the EU’s GDPR.
One recommendation is to regulate social networking platforms as harmful and addictive products, much
as we regulate tobacco and alcohol, as suggested by Professor Jan Trzaskowski of Copenhagen Business School.
Alternatively, they could be regulated as unsafe public
spaces, as suggested by Professor Amanda Shanor of
The Wharton School.

4.4.New Problems — Gateways and Third
Party Payer Systems
Google and Amazon control critical online gateways. Amazon, and its Alexa, and Google, and its
online assistant, are becoming dominant forces in postpandemic retailing, with power and reach well beyond
that of any traditional retailers.
Perhaps the most interesting business model of the
internet is the combination of an online gateway with
a third-party payer system. Google is essential for users who want to find sellers, and sellers know this; hence
sellers are willing to pay to be found, and willing to pay
to avoid being hidden from buyers. Over time search
platforms have become essential, and have mastered the
art of charging sellers to be found, and of transferring
part of the payments they receive to buyers to maintain
their loyalty. When search engines compete they actually increase rather than decrease the prices they charge
sellers to be found and then increase the payment to users to buy more loyalty. These mandatory participation
third party payer systems are perhaps unique; they

appear to be the only businesses where competition
causes the competitors to increase the prices they charge
their customers, and then use the revenues to buy loyalty.
These reverse price wars are successful because party1, the users, do not know about or care about the prices
charged to party-3, the sellers, and because party-3 has
no choice. If users use only one search platform, which
is true of most users, then party-3 has to participate in
all platforms, and cannot reject a platform simply because it has become more expensive. There may not be
a market solution that can eliminate reverse price wars.
These are still a serious problem today, four decades after the first legal judgments against them [3].
Precision pricing and abuse of the most needy
and least informed has been discussed briefly as one of
the dangers of harmful and addictive platform usage.
Fully informed sellers can exploit perfect information,
can perform perfect price discrimination, and can extract an increasing fraction of the value created by innovation [31]. This is efficient pricing, and marketers and
economists have dreamed of it for years. Is efficient
pricing always appropriate? As a society, do we agree?
And if not, how do we prohibit it? There is no market
solution. Companies that can attract and retain the most
profitable customers always outperform their competitors [3].
We are experiencing unprecedented concentration
of economic and political power without necessary
regulatory checks. No company in history has ever
grown to $250 billion as quickly as Facebook, and no
company has ever grown ubiquitous as quickly as Facebook. Facebook is global and there are no checks or restrictions that prohibit its being used to encourage genocide in Myanmar, or to recruit for the Islamic state, or
to support dictatorship in the Philippines [1].
Do we have consensus on our right to regulate Big
Tech or on what forms of regulation are appropriate?
Would the firms even permit regulation? Or have they
become so powerful, so able to manipulate legislators
through lobbying, and so able to manipulate consumers’
views that they are now beyond regulation?

4.5.New Problems — Emergence of Powerful Life Control Interfaces
Smartphones and at-home digital assistants have
become far more than phones, and indeed far more than
devices for communicating with other people. They
have become our life control interfaces [24]. They contain our schedules, our plans, our to-do-lists, our contacts, our photographs. They are our indispensable cybernetically enhanced memories. They are our access
points to the net, including our access to search and to
shopping, and to services ranging from restaurant delivery to taxis and other forms of local transportation. We
use them to manage our schedules, order our groceries,
control our music and our television and even the
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lighting in our homes. They provide real-time directions,
and even when we do not let them actually control our
movements we let them influence or decide our movements for us.
Life control interfaces influence, and even determine, what we buy and where and when we buy it. As
the emerging internet of things enhances the power of
smart appliances and autonomous vehicles, life control
interfaces will become increasingly important, and their
American owners will gain dangerous power over the
behavior of all European consumers.
Platforms are increasingly not neutral agents that
we control. Increasingly, these life control interfaces
have their own agendas, and subtly control our lives
while we believe we are controlling ourselves [31. If we
ask Alexa to get us six cans of lentil soup, we know
where she is going to shop. She will direct the order to
one of Amazon’s own operations, but at least she will
probably order our favorite brand. If we ask Google to
get us the same thing, both the brand and the price are
certain to be acceptable, but both the brand and the store
will be determined by algorithms like those used for
sponsored search. With Alexa many retailers are
squeezed out of the distribution channel, and with
Google retailers and manufacturers once again are
forced to pay to participate.
Consumers are not harmed in any obviously way,
and will increasingly become dependent upon their life
control interfaces. But competition is harmed, and retailers will increasingly be harmed by this new form of
anticompetitive behavior. Likewise, consumers will not
be able to obtain the full range of value from their smart
cars without a relationship between the car manufacturer and the owner of the interface, Android or iOS.
Likewise, manufacturers will not be able to achieve the
full range of value from their smart home appliances
without a relationship between the car manufacturer and
the owner of the interface, Android or iOS.

5. Why is it so Hard to Develop Appropriate Responses to the Power of Big Tech?
It has been extremely difficult to develop a strategy
for responding to the power of Big Tech companies. We
cannot agree on the questions to ask. We cannot agree
on what regulation should look like or on what social
policy should look like until we agree on what problems
we are facing and how we would know when we found
an appropriate solution.
It’s impossible to implement any solution without
consensus on what the problem actually is. It’s impossible to implement any solution without an understanding of individuals’ objectives and without understanding the tradeoffs among them. Without this understanding we would lack public support for any proposed solution. That’s why we have conducted extensive survey
research, in order to understand consumer behavior.

This is described in detail in section 7.
Similarly, we will need to understand the concerns
of executives in industries directly affected by the
power of Big Tech, its power over existing gateways to
control access to consumers, and the emerging power of
life control interfaces like Alexa.
And we will need to understand how to teach people to make decisions in their own long-term best interest, which includes understanding motivation and selfcontrol, and both analytical and intuitive decision-making. This is described in detail in section 7.
This is why we are arguing so insistently for interdisciplinary research. The relevant disciplines obviously include information economics and business strategy, to understand what Big Tech firms want to do, and
how different regulatory restraints would affect their
ability to act in ways that regulators deem undesirable.
They would also include regulatory policy and regulatory economics. We will also need to include anthropology, sociology, and consumer psychology, so that we
know what consumers do and do not already understand,
what consumers do and do not want, and what consumers will and will not accept both from their services providers and from their governments. Without this it will
be impossible to design a regulatory policy that consumers will accept. There are lessons that must be learned
from Big Tech’s ability to derail both the US Congress
and the US Senate’s attempts to limit online theft and
republication of protected content.

6. What Responses are Appropriate to the
Problems of Digital Transformation of
Business and Society?
The most common recommendation in response to
Big Tech is to apply antimonopoly law more strictly
[17]. Historically, many problems have not been solvable through antimonopoly law. The harm from tobacco
addiction was not caused by the monopoly power of any
individual tobacco company, but by lack of transparency regarding harm, by powerful advertising and lobbying efforts, and by humans’ well-known inability to
trade off immediate benefits against long-term harm.
The solution was a combination of mandatory labeling,
increased taxes, and outright ban on sale to minors. The
problem of lead in gasoline was not caused by the monopoly power of gasoline companies around the world,
but again by lobbying and lack of transparency concerning future harm. The problem was solved by actions
banning leaded gasoline in the entire industrialized
world and by requiring automobile companies to produce vehicles that did not require leaded gasoline. The
problems of externalities — harm to others caused by
our own economic activities — are not caused by monopolies. The most obvious examples, such as air and
water pollution, are not caused because coal companies,
other extractive industries companies, refineries, and
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chemical companies are monopolies. They are caused
by a lack of transparency: we cannot immediately judge
the harm we are causing others. And they are caused by
a lack of altruism: we don’t care about the harm our activities cause others. The problems of defective, harmful,
or addictive products were not caused by monopoly
power.
Additionally, some of the problems we face today
are without precedent. The power of platform envelopment is not caused directly by the existence of a monopoly, but by the leverage of that monopoly to create additional power in other areas of economic activity.

6.1.What Solutions are Appropriate for Externalities?
Uber increases traffic congestion and increases air
pollution by reducing reliance on more fuel-efficient
public transportation. Airbnb alters neighborhoods, allowing residential housing to be converted to commercial near-hotels and forcing out long-time residents.
And yet city-dwellers love Uber, and tourists and many
parts of the tourism industry love Airbnb.
There is no universal solution. Solutions need to be
negotiated locally among all stakeholders. But who
should be consulted? Should hotels be represented,
since they are harmed? How can foreign tourists be represented in local analysis of tradeoffs?

6.2.What Solutions are Appropriate for
Platform Envelopment?
There has been little academic study of the problems of platform envelopment, although regulators are
beginning to act. The Department of Justice litigation
against Microsoft was at its core about platform envelopment. The record-setting €4.34 billion judgment of
the EU Competition Commission against Google was
likewise about platform envelopment and about denying
competitors equal access to their Android platform.
Since platform envelopment revolves around denying access to an essential platform, an effective solution
would require allowing unrestricted access. This requires that a firm provides services to its competitors.
Duty to deal in the US is usually applied only when a
company that had been providing services ceases to do
so solely for anticompetitive reasons [14]. Likewise, although the Essential Facilities Doctrine [22] was effectively used in litigation against American Airlines’
abuse of Sabre and to compel AT&T to provide MCI
access to individual subscribers’ phones, it is now seldom employed either in American or EU litigation.
Analysis is complicated in part because consumers do
benefit from the super-additive value created by the
platform operator [3]. The key decision is determining
a fair price that the platform owners charge for access.

6.3.What is the Appropriate Remedy for
Abuse of Control of Gateways?
Abuse of gateways is a dominant online business
model, especially when combined with third party payer
systems and reverse price wars. Consumers rarely see
the indirect costs they create for themselves by using
free search. Search engines are not required to provide
consumers with the best possible search results, and
sometimes, when the profits are large enough, they will
return search results that are actually dangerous and
harmful. The most extreme examples involved
Google’s facilitating illegal drug smuggling into the
United States [27].
But harmful search results are rare today. Google
has learned that allowing inferior suppliers to purchase
top spots in search is rarely good business. Consumers
would learn to distrust paid search results, which would
be catastrophic for Google’s business model. And it is
more profitable to provide the top spots in sponsored
search to suppliers that consumers will actually click on,
since that produces revenue. Google uses a combination
of the seller’s quality score and the seller’s bid to determine its location in the search results it shows users.
Google reserves the right to adjust quality scores in order to extract as much money as it chooses to extract
from winning bidders, but it rarely shows truly inferior
sellers to consumers any more. It uses the threat of not
showing a particular seller as a mechanism for extracting high prices even from sellers who should automatically show up at the top of search.
Some of the profits extracted by the search engine
are returned directly to consumers through a range of
other services, making search engines appear to be more
free than free. These payments are used to buy loyalty
from users and to increase market share. As a result,
competition among search engines actually increases
the price they charge sellers to be found. Breaking up
Google would not reduce the cost of keywords, or the
costs sellers pay as a result of participating in search,
but would actually increase them. Since a significant
portion of higher costs are always passed along to consumers, free search may ultimately prove to be the most
expensive way of providing search. Since breaking up
Google would only increase the cost of keywords, and
thus would only increase the indirect costs of free search
paid by consumers, we need another mechanism. Both
the cost of keywords and preferencing of a search engine’s own offerings above those of competitors have
led to the imposition of massive fines by the EU’s Competition Commissioner.
Bracha and Pasquale have suggested the creation of
a Federal Search Commission [2]. Their intent was to
eliminate search bias and ensure that consumers obtain
the best possible search results. But the FSC could also
address two other problems created by the current
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market for search. It could set tariffs and limit the costs
imposed by any search. It could eliminate abuses such
as preferencing the search engine’s own offerings ahead
of those of other competitors.
Regulation of search will not be easy. Our most recent research suggests that even in 2020 consumers do
not approve of Google’s behavior but would be reluctant to share data with any Google competitor and would
be reluctant to switch to a paid service even if it preserved their privacy [6, 15].

6.4.What Solutions are Appropriate for Restricting the Use of Social Media for Manipulation?
Social media are used to manipulate public opinion,
both in elections and in marketing. Social media are
used to advocate extremist political or religious ideas,
and to radicalize and recruit new members for a wide
range of dangerous extremist groups. The problem has
been called an existential threat to democracy [20], but
Facebook has successfully defended its practices using
arguments related to freedom of speech and to its use of
data to as part of its core marketing strategy.
Jaron Lanier has suggested that we all terminate our
accounts and stop our use of social media [14], but
Jaron’s readers are not among Facebook’s most susceptible users. Mark Zuckerberg expressed no concern
about a boycott by advertisers, since he was certain that
they would all come back.

6.5.What Solutions are Appropriate for
Abuse of Life Control Interfaces?
Life control interfaces require data to operate, and
these are cospecialized assets in the sense described by
Teece [27]; firms that control cospecialized assets are
the firms that profit from innovations. Clemons and
Row explain how this is especially true in informationbased innovations [7]. A smart car needs data in the
user’s phone to arrange to pick up guests and drive them
to dinner, a smart shopping assistant needs access to
other information stored elsewhere in the user’s life
control interface. No single automobile manufacturer,
appliance manufacturer, or retailer can provide a compelling reason for users to reenter their data or for them
to adopt a new life control interface. Apple iOS, Google
Assistant, and Amazon are here to stay.
The most plausible response would be the creation
of a single cooperative pan-EU life control interface that
is transparent, regulated, and agnostic about where to
shop and would have full access to the consumers’ data.
The GDPR ensures that users own their data and that
they have the right to download data to any competing
platforms, but most users lack the patience, the skill, and
the motivation to do so. A pan-EU life control interface
could provide motivation, by offering superior unbiased

service, and could provide access to the data necessary
for the interface’s operation.
Alternatively, Alexa, Android, and iOS could be
regulated as essential facilities in the US, the model for
regulating airline reservations systems in the 1980s.

7. Support For Regulatory Actions
We explored the level of support among consumers
and among executives for increased levels of regulatory
protection. We believe that this is essential because it
provides motivation for regulators as well as insights
into how proposed regulation will be received and
which forms of regulation will be effective.

7.1.Completed Work — Online Behavior of
Young Users and Parental Concerns
Not surprisingly students engage in unsafe behavior online, and not surprisingly there is parental support
for increased protection against data mining their children’s online behavior. This was true in all 12 countries
in which we conducted surveys [8, 10, 11].

7.2.Recent Work — EU Executives’ Increasing Understanding and Increasing
Levels of Concern
We examined the attitudes of EU executives towards American domination of the net and their domination of customer-facing online interactions [6, 15].
Executives exhibited a range of concerns and a range of
explanations for this domination. We used ethnographic
observation and the tools of anthropology to guide our
work exploring executives’ own concerns.
We sought to assess whether executives saw this
domination as a problem for European firms. Executives discussed the following issues: (1) Concerns
rooted in fear of monopoly power regardless of nationalities of the owners, (2) Concerns because a small number of firms controlled critical infrastructure, (3) Concerns because the dominant firms are American and not
European, (4) Concerns because these firms were not
subject to European standards of regulation and did not
adhere to European codes of behavior, or (5) no problem
at all as long as there was sufficient competition among
dominant firms.
We meet with senior executives from 17 firms in
Germany, 6 in Denmark and 5 in France and with one
European regulatory institution. We spoke to individuals from 14 different industries. The interviews explored
enough points of view, from enough industrial sectors,
to capture the most important questions.
The following emerged as executives’ beliefs about
the sources of initial American domination:
• Greater risk tolerance of American finance, more fear
of missing out on the next Google than fear of investing in another Pets.com
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• American firm’s greater willingness to risk potentially illegal behavior during periods of regulatory
ambiguity
• Privacy policies that allowed American firms huge income streams from privacy mining, not available to
EU firms
• Lack of enforcement of antimonopoly law, allowing
creation of platform monopolies like Android, funded
in part from privacy mining
• Competing in a single market with a single language
and a common culture
• Competing in a market that had always been more
open to early adoption of technology
The following emerged as executives’ explanations
for sustained American domination:
• Continued American privacy mining as a source of
revenue not available to EU firms
• Cross-subsidies and funding of additional ventures
out of these revenues, and the creation of new sources
of American monopoly power
• Platform envelopment and the use of American platforms like Android and gateways like Alexa to create
new sources of monopoly power
There is a greater level of concern among EU executives than we observed previously. There is still a lack
of consensus on the source of American domination.
There is also a lack of consensus on how to respond and
if an effective response is available in the absence of
regulatory interventions. When executives did believe
that intervention was possible, they focused on ending
American firms’ ability to use revenues from privacy
mining to subsidize new sources of monopoly power,
and on ending platform envelopment and leveraging
platforms like Android to exclude competitors.

7.3.Recent Work — EU Consumers’ Level
of Concern with Google and Facebook
We conducted surveys to examine consumers’ attitudes towards new business models and towards firms
that monetize consumers’ personal information. Surveys assessed consumers’ knowledge of Google’s and
Facebook’s current business practices and also assessed
their approval or disapproval of those practices, independent of their belief that those practices currently occurred [15, 16]. This allowed us to determine implicit
informed consent; individuals who both knew of and approved of these practices. We also studied their willingness to switch to alternative clean services, that is, services that do not violate privacy or monetize private information. We studied their degree of satisfaction with
regulatory current levels of regulatory protections. We
saw very little differences among consumers in France,
Germany, the UK, and the US. When compared to our
own previous studies, we saw a slight increase in informed consent; this was not due to an increase in consumers who approved of Google’s practices of Google

and Facebook, and is explained by a slight increase in
consumers who were now aware of Google’s practices.
Our study contributes to the design of regulatory policies to improve consumer welfare by assessing consumers awareness, willingness to take actions to protect
themselves, and levels of satisfaction with existing regulatory protections.
Consumers’ levels of informed consent were quite
low, averaging 5%, and only once reaching 10% (consumers awareness that Google used GPS positioning in
making recommendations). Consumers in general were
not satisfied with the levels of protection they received
from their regulators’ ability to ensure they were aware
of company practices, aware of potential for harm, and
actually protected from harm. Percentages satisfied for
each question for Facebook were (22.0%, 21.6%, and
21.2%) and for Google were (23.2%, 24.6%, and
24.5%).
However, it is difficult to determine if consumers
are likely to protect themselves or to approve of regulatory actions to protect them. While consumers do express a preference for safer alternatives, and expressed
a willingness to switch to them if they were available
(Facebook, 41.2%, Google 41.5%), very few were willing to pay for safer services (31.5%, 30.6%). Regulatory
action to protect consumers’ privacy would invariably
result in higher prices for services, and the value that
consumers currently place on their privacy appears to be
quite low. Consumers might be willing to accept costs
of using newer cleaner services if they were more aware
of the real but hidden costs of using Facebook and
Google; that suggests that regulators will find consumers more accepting if regulation is accompanied by actions that increase transparency and consumer awareness of how they are actually being harmed. Alternatively, the privacy paradox might be quite real, and
while consumers claim to want more protection they are
truly unwilling to pay for it. That would suggest very
limited acceptance of enhanced protection, even protection that limits uses of data that consumers find dangerous or damaging. It would also suggest that increased
public awareness of abuses by large online platforms
would not result immediately in reduced usage.

8. Other Considerations
Technology and online applications do not respect
any international borders. Any attempt to regulate Western firms must be approached carefully, or we will cripple our domestic firms and create opportunities for them
to be replaced by new entrants with worse behavior.
Regulation is only one approach. Market solutions
would work if the public’s commercial behavior considered the impacts to others and avoided harmful externalities. Unfortunately, the lack of transparency ensures
that the public is mostly unaware of the harm that Big
Tech causes. And there is little indication that diffuse
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harm changes individual behavior. Higher prices that result from merchants’ key word costs seems an abstract
and theoretical danger, and the joys of staying in a perfectly located Airbnb dominate concerns for displaced
local residents. Can we implement policy without public
support? Should we? Do we have the right to do so?
Other authors have suggested that the moral education of the firm, its executives, and its board of directors,
would lead to a new social contract between firms and
society. Employees, customers, and society as a whole
would be included among the firm’s stakeholders, and
would reduce the role of shareholders, profits, and market valuation as metrics of a firm’s performance [26].

9. Conclusions
9.1.Contributions
We have focused on some of the most pressing
problems facing modern society. We addressed a small
set of problems that are novel, or newly significant, and
that are not yet resolved by current regulation. Moreover, we have explained why these are problems that are
unlikely to be solved by transparency, by changes in
consumer behavior, by market forces, or even by a combination of all three. These problems require interdisciplinary study. And we have sketched out how some of
these problems might be approached.

9.2.Limitations and Suggestions for Future
Research
This work is preliminary. It addresses work in five
of our six phases, but stops short of making policy recommendations. It is both a summary of completed work
and a call for further interdisciplinary research.
Steps forward are based on continued cooperation
with a diverse set of colleagues globally. We will continue to seek input from executives, consumers, and the
platform operators themselves. We will continue to
work with regulators, principally in Europe, and wherever they appear open to academic suggestions.
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